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1. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews inflation developments in
Portugal in the 25-year period from the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system to the adoption of the
euro(1). The emphasis is placed on the interaction
between the behaviour of prices and the evolution
of the monetary policy strategy, reflecting the
monetary origins of inflation from a medium to
long-run perspective. Against this background,
section 2 provides an overview of inflation behav-
iour in the post-Bretton Woods era, and section 3
describes the evolution of monetary and exchange
rate policy strategy over the same period. Section 4
concludes. A set of chronologies completes the
present review: Table I provides relevant informa-
tion on the computation of inflation statistics; Ta-
ble II covers relevant changes in taxation; and Ta-
ble III sets out the changes to the monetary and ex-
change rate policy objectives and to the Statutes of
the Banco de Portugal.
2. OVERVIEW OF INFLATION
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POST BRETTON
WOODS ERA
The Portuguese inflation experience since the
fall of the Bretton Woods system can be divided
into two major sub-periods: a period of very high
and volatile inflation up to the mid-1980s, fol-
lowed by a period of disinflation from the
mid-1980s to the late-1990s(2) (Table 1 and Chart 1).
In the 1970s, the Portuguese economy had to
cope with a series of severe negative shocks. The
domestic political and social turmoil that followed
the April 1974 revolution magnified the impact of
the first oil shock. Substantial wage increases were
enacted, and a large part of the productive sector
was nationalised in 1975 (in particular the whole
financial sector became state-run). In addition, the
country had to absorb a significant increase in its
population (about 7 per cent in 1974-76), as Portu-
guese citizens returned from the ex-colonies in Af-
rica. As a result, a big recession occurred – GDP
declined 4.5 per cent in 1975 (Chart 2) –, and un-
employment increased substantially. Inflation,
which had shown a slight upward trend since the
early 1960s, rose sharply, to about 30 per cent in
1974.
In spite of a relative normalization of the politi-
cal situation in the late 1970s, significant macro-
economic instability prevailed until the mid-1980s,
reflecting the combined impact of the two world
oil price shocks and the unsound macro policies
pursued for most of the period. Substantial public
sector deficits, essentially financed by the central
bank, fuelled inflation; the resulting loss of com-
petitiveness forced devaluation of the nominal ex-
change rate, which in turn added to price pres-
sures: the country was caught in a vicious circle of
inflation and devaluation. In the period 1973-1985,
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views expressed are those of the author, and not necessarily
those of the Banco de Portugal. I am particularly indebted to
Ricardo Felix for providing Chart 2 and to Teresa Nascimento
for compiling Tables I and II. I am also grateful for the com-
ments and suggestions by Isabel Gameiro and Maximiano
Pinheiro. The usual disclaimer applies.
(1) The article was written as a contribution to a joint project
within the Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network.
(2) For an account of the Portuguese disinflation experience, see
Abreu (2001).CPI inflation averaged 22 per cent, and fluctuated
between 17 and 29 per cent.
When Portugal joined the European Commu-
nity (EC) in January 1986, it had the second high-
est inflation rate amongst EC Member-States (only
surpassed by Greece), and the differential against
the EC average stood at about 14 percentage
points. At this time, disinflation became a major
goal of economic policy. To ensure a sustained de-
cline of inflation, exchange rate policy became pro-
gressively less accommodating, so as to break the
vicious circle of inflation and devaluation (see sec-
tion 3). In addition, economic agents were encour-
aged to set nominal wages on the basis of expected
(rather than past) price increases. Inflation, which
was close to 30 per cent in 1984, declined to levels
broadly compatible with price stability by the end
of the 1990s.
Chart 3 shows the contributions to the change
in the private consumption deflator during the
disinflation period(3). In the early years, disinfla-
tion benefited from favourable international price
developments (including oil prices) and significant
productivity gains, both of which contributed to
the steep deceleration of prices in a context of
strong GDP growth. In the late 1980s and early
1990s, as the Portuguese economy began to over-
heat and international price developments turned
less favourable, the inflation rate temporarily re-
sumed an upward trend and the pursuit of disin-
flation had to rely on a less accommodative stance
of exchange rate policy. In the mid-1990s, the de-
celeration of unit labour costs following the 1993
recession also gave an important contribution to
the decline of inflation.
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(3) The figures were obtained from the relevant equations of an
annual macroeconomic model currently used in the projection
exercises carried out by the Banco de Portugal.
Table 1
PORTUGAL – INFLATION DEVELOPMENTS
1973-1998
Average(a) Volatility(b)
1973-1998 ......... 14.8 3.5
1973-1985 ......... 21.8 4.7
1986-1998 ......... 7.7 1.7
Notes:
(a) Inflation measured by the annual percentage change of the
CPI;
(b) Volatility corresponds to the standard deviation of the differ-
ences between actual and trend inflation (measured as a
five-year centred-moving average).
Chart 1


















Banco de Portugal and INE.
Note:
(a) Average CPI inflation. Trend computed as 5-year mov-
ing average.
Chart 2

















European Commission AMECO Database.3. MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
FROM THE COLLAPSE OF THE BRETTON
WOODS SYSTEM TO EMU
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the
first oil shock and the 1974 Revolution brought
profound changes to the conduct of macroeco-
nomic policies in Portugal. In 1974-75, the priority
of economic policy was to cope with the recession
and the increase in unemployment. The money
supply was adjusted to finance a widening public
sector deficit, and a selective rediscount policy was
put in place to promote activities linked to agricul-
ture, exports and investment. Interest rates, which
were subject to limits set by the central bank, were
increased only slightly, resulting in significantly
negative real rates (Chart 4)(4).
Although the escudo had been formally float-
ing since March 1973, the effective exchange rate
was kept broadly stable in 1974-75 so as to contain
the inflationary pressures resulting from the in-
crease in oil prices and steep wage acceleration(5).
However, as from 1976, the rapid decline of for-
eign exchange reserves (Chart 5) and the need to
restore the competitiveness lost in the previous
years led to a policy of gradual devaluation of the
escudo. In 1977, severe balance of payments diffi-
culties imposed a shift of priorities in economic
policy. On 25 February 1977, the escudo suffered a
15 per cent devaluation, and six months later a
crawling-peg regime was established (Chart 6).
The crawling-peg consisted of a pre-announced
monthly depreciation rate of the escudo vis-à-vis a
basket of 13 currencies. The monthly rate of depre-
ciation was initially set at 1 per cent. In 1978, a sta-
bilisation programme had to be negotiated with
the IMF. The package provided for a discrete de-
valuation of the escudo (6.1 per cent on 5 May), an
increase of the pre-announced monthly rate of de-
preciation to 1.25 per cent, and the introduction of
quantitative limits for bank credit, as a way of con-
trolling the money supply. The package set a limit
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(4) Following the 1974 Revolution, the Banco de Portugal was na-
tionalised. The new Statutes of the Bank, approved in November
1975 (Decree-Law No.664/75 of 15 November), provided that
the issue of money should be planned in order to coordinate
“the management of foreign exchange reserves and the credit
to be granted by the Bank with the economy’s needs for stabili-
sation and development” (Article 13). This provision put an
end to the close link between the monetary base and the level
of foreign exchange reserves that had prevailed under the
Bretton Woods system. The Statutes also provided for the pos-
sibility of extensive credit to be granted by the Bank to the pub-
lic sector (Article 23 and 25). Finally, the Statutes conferred
upon the Bank the power to determine the interest rate regime
applying to the banking sector, as well as to set the conditions
governing the banks’ credit operations (Article 27).
(5) Extensive capital controls made it possible for the authorities to
simultaneously control domestic interest rates and the ex-
change rate.
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Unit labour costs Import prices excl. oil
Energy prices Other
Observed (in per cent)
Source:
Banco de Portugal Long Term Series for Portuguese Economy and
INE.
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CPI inflation (annual average)
Source:
European Commission AMECO Database and INE.for the balance of payments deficit (i.e. for the
change in the consolidated banking sector net ex-
ternal assets) and a corresponding target for the
expansion of total domestic credit. In practice,
given the behaviour of the general government
deficit, credit to the private sector was adjusted to
ensure compliance with the limit set for the
growth of total credit.
In the early 1980s, as the world economy was
hit by the second oil shock, an expansionary mac-
roeconomic policy was put in place in Portugal.
On 12 February 1980, the escudo was revalued by
6 per cent, and in June of the same year the crawl-
ing-peg monthly devaluation rate was reduced to
0.5 per cent. At the same time, credit controls were
eased and no fiscal consolidation took place. The
expansionary policy stance, which was clearly mo-
tivated by the political calendar (general elections
were to be held in October), aggravated the impact
of the second oil shock and external accounts
again went out of control. As the current account
deficit (including capital transfers) reached 13 per
cent of GDP in 1982, a second stabilisation package
had to be negotiated with the IMF. Credit controls
were tightened and the depreciation of the escudo
was intensified. Like the previous package, the
second IMF programme was quite successful in re-
storing balance of payments equilibrium. This
came however, at the cost of a new recession (after
stagnating in 1983, GDP fell by 2 per cent in 1984),
and a renewed increase of inflation, which again
came close to 30 per cent.
In short, monetary policy in Portugal in the
mid-1980s was still based on credit ceilings and
administered interest rates. Extensive capital con-
trols were in place, and the exchange rate followed
a crawling peg regime aimed at preserving the
competitiveness of Portuguese exporters in a con-
text of high inflation, chronic budget deficits and
recurrent payments crises. The poor economic per-
formance of the previous period made it clear that
a regime shift on macroeconomic stability and
structural reform would be needed to put the
economy on a sustainable growth path. Accord-
ingly, in the mid-1980s, an ambitious economic
programme aimed at sustained disinflation, bud-
getary consolidation and wide-ranging structural
reform was put in place(6). The country’s integra-
tion in the European Community in 1986 provided
the catalyst for implementation of the reform
programme. The exchange rate was chosen as the
central piece in the disinflation strategy, a natural
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(6) See the 10th Constitutional Government Programme, dated
November 1985 (Diário da Assembleia da República,I Isérie, N.4,
16/11/1985).
Chart 5























Banco de Portugal and European Commission AMECO Data-
base.
Note:
The gold reserves of Banco de Portugal were revalued in 1980
so as to bring their book value close to the market value of
gold (Decree-Law N.107/80 of 10 May 1980). The change in
gold reserves amounted to 16.6 per cent of GDP, explaining 90
per cent of the increase in net foreign assets in 1980.
Chart 6




































Banco de Portugal.choice for a small open economy, where import
prices play a key role in the inflation process. The
monthly rate of depreciation was gradually cut
back from 1986, and no more discrete devaluations
were carried out. As seen previously, inflation de-
clined very rapidly up to 1987, but resumed an up-
ward trend in 1988-90. Since the monthly rate of
devaluation of the escudo continued to be cut
back, the inflation differential against Portugal’s
main trading partners was no longer fully offset,
and the escudo started appreciating in real terms
(Chart 6).
In the late 1980s, in the context of the gradual
liberalisation of the capital account, the monetary
authorities experienced significant difficulties in
controlling domestic liquidity. The decline in the
country’s risk premium after EC accession at-
tracted significant amounts of foreign direct in-
vestment to Portugal. In addition, a large interest
rate differential vis-à-vis the core European cur-
rencies, coupled with a tightly managed (and thus
highly predictable) exchange rate in the context of
the crawling-peg regime, fostered massive inflows
of short-term capital. The central bank was caught
in a vicious circle, as it tried to simultaneously
control domestic interest rates and the exchange
rate. Foreign exchange interventions to contain the
pressure towards the appreciation of the escudo
increased domestic liquidity, impairing the effec-
tiveness of credit ceilings.
The interruption of the disinflation process in
the late 1980s and the difficulties in controlling do-
mestic liquidity prompted radical changes in the
conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies in
the early 1990s. New Banco de Portugal Statutes
were adopted in October 1990, imposing strict lim-
its to the financing of the public sector by the cen-
tral bank. Credit ceilings were abolished and mar-
ket-based liquidity management was put in place
(most interest rate controls had already been elimi-
nated during the second half of the 1980s). In addi-
tion, controls to short-term capital inflows were
temporarily re-imposed and the crawling-peg re-
gime had to be abandoned. As from October 1990,
the escudo was allowed to fluctuate within an un-
disclosed band against a basket composed of the
five main ERM currencies. The authorities wished
to introduce some short-term unpredictability in
the exchange rate of the escudo, so as to discour-
age short-term capital inflows. The new exchange
rate policy was also aimed at preparing the coun-
try for future participation in the ERM.
The new regime failed to discourage capital in-
flows since, as before, the Banco de Portugal con-
tinued to impose high domestic interest rates to
fight inflation, while at the same time intervening
in the foreign exchange market to contain the pres-
sure towards the appreciation of the escudo. In an
environment characterised by strong optimism re-
garding the prospects for the creation of a mone-
tary union in Europe, and by favourable prospects
for the Portuguese economy, investors saw the
Portuguese currency as a “one-way bet”. In spite
of the massive sales of escudos by the Banco de
Portugal - the central bank’s net foreign assets
stood at around 30 per cent of GDP in 1989-1991
(Chart 5) - the nominal effective exchange rate ap-
preciated by almost 3 per cent in the 18 months
that followed the abolition of the crawling-peg.
Given that the inflation differential against the EU
average was still significant, this translated into a
substantial real appreciation of the currency. The
conduct of monetary policy in this period was fur-
ther complicated by the expansionary stance of fis-
cal policy(7), which added to the strong growth of
private sector expenditure, giving rise to an in-
creasingly unbalanced policy-mix. In spite of the
difficulties in running monetary policy, inflation
resumed a downward path in 1991, as high do-
mestic real interest rates and the appreciation of
the currency helped contain price pressures
(Charts 4 and 6).
In April 1992, the Portuguese currency joined
the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the Euro-
pean Monetary System(8). From an operational
point of view, participation in the ERM was not
radically different from the exchange rate policy
that was actually being followed from October
1990. However, the formal commitment to keeping
the escudo within a pre-established band was ex-
pected to reinforce the medium-term credibility of
the Portuguese authorities’ anti-inflation stance,
and to have a favourable impact on inflation ex-
pectations. Exchange rate stability vis-à-vis a set of
currencies characterised by a high degree of nomi-
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(7) For an account of fiscal policy in the period 1986-1994, see
Cunha and Neves (1995).
(8) Abreu (2003) provides a detailed account of the experience of
the Portuguese escudo in the ERM.nal stability should provide a powerful anchor to
reach and maintain price stability over the me-
dium-run. ERM membership was also a necessary
step to ensure that the country would be a candi-
date for participation in Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU).
The escudo joined what was then called the
wide band, which allowed for a6per cent fluctu-
ation of the market rate around the bilateral cen-
tral rates against the other ERM currencies. The
central rate against the German currency, which
was effectively the anchor of the system, was set at
86.9393 escudos per German mark. The entry rate
was broadly in line with available estimates for the
escudo’s equilibrium real exchange rate. The
strong performance of the external sector since the
mid-1980s, as evidenced by the market share gains
of Portuguese exporters and a broadly balanced
current account, suggested that the steep real ap-
preciation of the currency in the previous years
had been, at least to a large extent, an equilibrium
phenomenon(9).
In the early months of participation in the sys-
tem, foreign capital continued to be attracted by
the high interest rate differentials, putting upward
pressure on the escudo. However, the situation
changed radically in the summer of 1992, with the
onset of the ERM crisis, which ultimately led to a
widening of the fluctuation bands to 15 per cent
in August 1993. During the ERM crisis, the central
rate of the escudo was devalued twice, and the
Portuguese currency depreciated by about 10 per
cent in effective terms, and by twice as much
against the German mark. The ERM crisis and the
related depreciation the Portuguese escudo did
not prevent a steady decline of the inflation rate in
the period of ERM membership. Consistent with
the announced strategy, the authorities did not
make use of the enlarged room for manoeuvre
provided by the wider ERM bands: official interest
rates were adjusted and substantial interventions
were carried out whenever necessary to preserve
exchange rate stability. The period from the en-
largement of the ERM bands to the end of 1998
was thus one of increasing stability of the escudo,
as attested by the fact that, in spite of a third re-
alignment in March 1995, the escudo’s conversion
rate into the euro was very close to the market ex-
change rate vis-à-vis the German mark prevailing
in August 1993 (Chart 7).
As shown in section 2 above, average CPI infla-
tion declined from double-digit levels in the early
1990s to a range of 2-3 per cent in 1997-98. The
transmission of the exchange rate depreciation of
1992-93 to CPI inflation was rather limited, and
did not show up in the overall index. The signifi-
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(9) Manteu and Mello (1992) provide an estimate for the path of
the fundamental real equilibrium exchange rate of the Portu-
guese escudo in the period 1980-1992. Later studies reported
similar results (see, for instance, Costa (1998)). For a survey of
the arguments pointing to an equilibrium appreciation of the
Portuguese escudo, see Manteu and Neves (1998).
Chart 7
THE PORTUGUESE ESCUDO IN THE ERM
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Intervention index (+ sign = purchase of PTE)
O/N rate
Source:
Banco de Portugalcant deterioration of the cyclical position in
1992-1993, and the fact that the realignments of the
Portuguese escudo were not perceived as a regime
shift(10) helped contain the transmission of the de-
preciation to domestic prices. When the Portu-
guese economy re-bounded from 1994 onwards,
the successful preservation of exchange rate stabil-
ity since the enlargement of the bands anchored
inflation expectations and allowed for continued
disinflation. From the mid-1990s onwards, the
country benefited from a virtuous circle: improved
nominal convergence increased the prospects of
meeting the criteria for euro adoption, while at the
same time enhanced prospects for EMU participa-
tion facilitated exchange rate stability, the decline
of interest rate differentials and the improvement
of the budget balance.
4. CONCLUSION
The history of Portuguese inflation from the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system to the adop-
tion of the euro contains two very distinct chap-
ters.
From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, inflation
was high and volatile, reflecting a monetary and
exchange rate policy that was primarily designed
to finance huge public sector deficits and to con-
tain the large external deficits that emerged as a
result of the economy’s overall economic imbal-
ances. The significantly negative real interest rates
and the continuous depreciation of the Portuguese
escudo illustrate the highly accommodative stance
of monetary and exchange rate policy throughout
the decade.
In the mid-1980s, coinciding with the country’s
accession to the European Community, control of
inflation became the main objective of monetary
and exchange rate policy. As policy became pro-
gressively less accommodating, the escudo started
appreciating in real terms and real interest rates
turned clearly positive. In 1990, the crawling-peg
regime gave way to a new monetary policy strat-
egy, based on exchange rate stability as the inter-
mediate target to reach the final goal of price sta-
bility. The subsequent integration of the escudo in
the exchange rate mechanism of the European
Monetary System was a further step in the author-
ities’ attempt to gain anti-inflation credibility. The
commitment to the policy of exchange rate stabil-
ity anchored inflation expectations, and helped
prevent a re-emergence of inflation pressures after
the depreciation of the escudo in the context of the
ERM crisis, and during the economy’s upswing in
the second half of the 1990s.
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(10)This probably reflects the fact that the escudo realignments
took place in a context of systemic adjustments, and were
likely regarded as unavoidable in the context of the devalua-
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Table III (to be continued)
CHANGES TO THE MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY OBJECTIVES AND TO THE STATUTES
OF THE BANCO DE PORTUGAL
Date Event
19 March 1973 ............................ Collapse of the Bretton Woods system; Portuguese escudo (PTE) floats.
25 April 1974 ............................. R e v olution puts an end to a 48-year dictatorship.
13 September 1974 ........................ Banco de Portugal is nationalised (Decree-Law N.452/74 of 13 September).
Mid-1973 to mid 1975 ..................... P T Eofficially floating, but stability of effective exchange rate is preserved.
March 1975 .............................. Commercial Banks and insurance companies nationalised, except those that were for-
eign-owned (Decree-Law N. 132-A/75 of 14 March).
15 November 1975 ........................ N e wStatutes of the Banco de Portugal (Decree-Law N.644/75 of 15 November). Accord-
ing to Article 13, the Bank’s issue of money is to be planned so as to coordinate “the
management of foreign exchange reserves and the credit to be granted by the Bank
with the economy’s needs for stabilisation and development”. Articles 23 and 25 pro-
vide for the possibility of extensive credit to be granted by the Bank to public sector.
Article 27 confers upon the Bank the power to determine the interest rate regime apply-
ing to the banking sector, as well as to set the conditions governing the banks’ credit
operations.
1976..................................... Correction of external imbalance becomes the priority of economic policy; exchange
rate becomes the key instrument to correct the external imbalance; depreciating trend
of the PTE against the major currencies.
25 February 1977.......................... P T Ei sd e v alued by 15 per cent vis-à-vis the currencies quoted by the Banco de Portu-
gal. The aim of keeping the PTE stable in effective terms as from this date is an-
nounced.
25 August 1977 ........................... Acrawling-peg regime is adopted. The crawling-peg consisted of a pre-announced
monthly depreciation rate of the escudo vis-à-vis a basket of 13 currencies. The
monthly rate of depreciation was initially set at 1 per cent.
August 1977.............................. P ortuguese inter-bank money market is set up (D-L N.353-R/77 of 29 August and
Banco de Portugal Circular N.72-21/77/DSOC of 31 August).
February 1978 ............................ P ortuguese Inter-bank securities market is set-up (Circular N.30-6/78/DSOC de
22/02/1978).
April 1978 ............................... First IMF Stabilisation Agreement.
5 May 1978............................... 6 . 1 p e r cent discrete devaluation of the effective exchange rate; pre-announced
monthly rate of depreciation increased to 1.25 per cent.84 Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / Spring 2005
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Table III (contd.)
CHANGES TO THE MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY OBJECTIVES AND TO THE STATUTES
OF THE BANCO DE PORTUGAL
Date Event
July 1978................................. Mandatory limits to credit growth are introduced.
April 1979 ............................... Pre-announced rate of devaluation reduced to 1.0 per cent.
June 1979 ................................ Pre-announced rate of devaluation reduced to 0.75 per cent.
12 February 1980.......................... Discrete 6.0 per cent revaluation of the effective exchange rate.
June 1980 ................................ Pre-announced rate of devaluation reduced to 0.50 per cent.
December 1981 ........................... Pre-announced rate of devaluation increased to 0.75 per cent.
16 June 1982.............................. Discrete 9.4 per cent devaluation of the effective exchange rate.
30 September 1982 ........................ First revision of the 1976 Constitution. Private banking and insurance allowed.
March 1983 .............................. Pre-announced rate of devaluation increased to 1.0 per cent.
23 March 1983 ............................ Discrete 2.0 per cent devaluation of the effective exchange rate.
22 June 1983.............................. Discrete 12.0 per cent devaluation of the effective exchange rate.
September 1983........................... Second IMF stabilisation agreement.
1984-1992 ................................ Progressive liberalisation of bank interest rates.
December 1985 ........................... Pre-announced rate of devaluation suspended.
1 January 1986............................ P ortugal joins the European Economic Community.
March 1986-December 1992 ................ Liberalisation of capital movements[a].
April 1986 ............................... Pre-announced rate of devaluation re-established at 0.90 per cent.
July 1986................................. Pre-announced rate of devaluation reduced to 0.70 per cent.
October 1986 ............................. Pre-announced rate of devaluation reduced to 0.60 per cent.Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / Spring 2005 85
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Table III (contd.)
CHANGES TO THE MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY OBJECTIVES AND TO THE STATUTES
OF THE BANCO DE PORTUGAL
Date Event
January 1987 ............................. Pre-announced rate of devaluation reduced to 0.50 per cent.
January 1988 ............................. Pre-announced rate of devaluation reduced to 0.40 per cent.
April 1988 ............................... Pre-announced rate of devaluation reduced to 0.30 per cent.
July 1988................................. Pre-announced rate of devaluation reduced to 0.25 per cent.
8 July 1989 ............................... Second revision of the 1976 Constitution opens up the possibility of re-privatisation of
nationalised companies.
March 1990 .............................. Compulsory credit ceilings suspended and replaced by recommendations on bank
credit expansion (the latter were abolished as from January 1991).
May 1990 ................................ Reserve requirement regime substantially modified. Range of institutions subject to re-
serve requirements and reserve base broadened. Single reserve coefficient set at 17 per
cent. Reserves were remunerated.
1 October 1990............................ Crawling-peg regime abandoned. The authorities announce that the objective of a
yearly depreciation of the effective exchange rate of 3 per cent will be kept, but that in
the short-term the escudo will be allowed to fluctuate within a non-announced band.
The reference basket against which the escudo is to be measured changed to a basket
composed of the 5 main ERM currencies (i.e., the German mark, Sterling, the French
franc, the Italian lira and the Spanish peseta).
30 October 1990........................... N e wStatutes of the Banco de Portugal (Decree-Law 337/90 of 30 October) confer upon
the Bank a greater autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy. The principle of no
monetary financing is established, but some exceptions remain: in particular, the State
retains the possibility of using an interest-free overdraft facility whose limit was fixed
as a percentage of the State’s current revenue.
December 1990 - March 1991 ............... Major operation aimed at absorbing the excess bank liquidity deposited with the
Banco de Portugal, which amounted to more than 12 per cent of GDP. The operation
involved the issue of public debt to be placed with the banking system. Part of this
loan was earmarked for early repayment of external public debt, whilst the remainder
was reserved for the redemption of public debt securities lying in the Banco de Portu-
gal’s portfolio.
1990-1991 ................................ Restrictions to the inflow of foreign capital re-introduced in a context of increasing dif-
ficulties to control domestic liquidity. In July 1990, a compulsory non-remunerated de-
posit amounting to 40 per cent of foreign borrowing by Portuguese residents was in-
troduced. One year later, restrictions were re-imposed on the purchase of floating-rate
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Table III (contd.)
CHANGES TO THE MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY OBJECTIVES AND TO THE STATUTES
OF THE BANCO DE PORTUGAL
Date Event
6 April 1992 .............................. P T E joins the ERM wide bands (6 per cent); central rate against the ECU set at
178.735 escudos per ECU and central rate against the DEM set at 86.9393 escudos per
DEM.
May 1992 ................................ Remaining interest rate controls abolished (the most important rates had been liberal-
ised up to 1989).
16 September............................. Anumber of ERM currencies suffer a major speculative attack. The central rate of the
Spanish peseta is devalued by 5 per cent; the British pound and the Italian lira with-
draw from the system. Banco de Portugal resorts to massive intervention and interest
rate increases and succeeds in defending the attack against the escudo.
23 November 1992 ........................ 6p e rcent devaluation f the PTE central rate (Spanish peseta also devalued by 6 per
cent).
16 December 1992......................... Remaining capital controls abolished. PTE fully convertible.
December 1992 ........................... T h eState is interest-free overdraft facility with the Banco de Portugal is abolished
(Law No.2/92). The amount outstanding is converted into a non-marketable 10-year
loan bearing a 1.3 per cent interest rate that would gradually converge to market rates.
1 February ............................... 1 0p e rcent devaluation of the central rate of the Irish pound.
13 May 1993.............................. 6 . 5d e v aluation of the PTE central rate (8 per cent devaluation of the Spanish peseta).
2 August 1993 ............................ Enlargement of the ERM fluctuation bands to15 per cent.
1 January 1994............................ Second phase of EMU – prohibition of monetary financing applies to the European
Union countries.
12 July 1994 .............................. Banco de Portugal money market intervention procedures improved. An absorption
facility is created to set a lower limit to very short-term money market interest rates.
An upper limit was already established by the rate applying to the Bank’s overnight
credit facility. Market rates to be steered through repos within the band established by
the absorption and overnight credit rates.
1 November 1994 ......................... N e wreserve requirement system. Reserve requirement ratio lowered from 17 per cent
(partially remunerated) to 2 per cent (non-remunerated). The liquidity released was
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Table III (contd.)
CHANGES TO THE MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY OBJECTIVES AND TO THE STATUTES
OF THE BANCO DE PORTUGAL
Date Event
6 March 1995 ............................. 3 . 5p e rcent devaluation of the PTE central rate (7 per cent devaluation of the Spanish
peseta).
12 September 1995 ........................ Banco de Portugal Statutes revised (Decree-Law N.231/95 of 12 September). The Bank
becomes responsible for maintaining “price stability, taking into account the overall
economic policy of the government”, and is given more independence in the conduct
of monetary policy. The prohibition of monetary financing in accordance with Com-
munity law is formally established.
31 January 1998........................... Banco de Portugal Statutes revised (Law No.5/98 of 31 January 1998). The new Law
grants independence to the Banco de Portugal and provides for the Bank’s integration
in the European System of Central Banks as from January 1999.
2 May 1998............................... European Council decides that Portugal meets the conditions to adopt the euro as
from 1 January 1999.
31 December 1998......................... P ortuguese escudo converted into euro at a rate of 200.482 PTE per euro (102.505 PTE
per German mark).
Note:
(a) For a chronology of the main steps in the process of capital movement liberalisation, see Banco de Portugal, Annual Report 1992
(Chapter V).